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  I. The Characteristics of the  Yogacara-madhyamika Philosophy 
  As.I have pointed out  earlier(,i)the following description  in the  Madhyamakaloka-nama  (Mal) 
of  Kamalagila (c.A.D.740-795) succinctly represents the philosophical position of the Yoga-
cara-madhyamika. 
(1) See IIThe  Yogacara-madhyamika view of Mind-only (citta-matra) of Part II.
 —  2  —
                          Concerning the Yogacara-madhyamika 
 (2...    "The theor
y of mind-only  (citta-rnatra) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional 
 trutlf(sainvrtyd) since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the object of 
   external world is not reasonable ven from the standpoint of conventional truth since the 
 -.2) 
   external world independent of he mind  [or internal  world] cannot be  established." 
 Let us examine the  Madhyamakdlainkdra-vrtti of  §an araksita (c.A.D. 725-788) while re-
ferring to  Kamalagila's commentary the  MadhyamakdlainkOra-paidikei to asc rtain whether 
the above description represents the position of the Yogacara-madhyamika. 
         (3... 
   That which is subject to the condition of cause  (karana) and effect  (karya) is none other 
 -.3) 
   than mind-only. That which is inherently established is  the.  product of the  mind  . 
  (MAK. 91) 
 (4.- 
 [We] cannot recognize the other nature of cognition  (jiidna) apart from that which poss-
   esses the nature that can inherently be established (viz., unperceivable  object). That 
   which is characterized by being inherently established  [as well as  mind] possesses the 
   nature like dream (svapna) or illusion  (mayci), etc. Even though [objects] such as color-
   form  (  rapa) which are assumed to exist in the external world exist independently ofcog-
(2) Mal  P171a5-6  D157a' 
 sems tsam ni ran gis rab  tu grub pa'i no bo  hid yin pa'i phyir  kun rdzob  tu gnas pa kho na yin  la  /  phyi'i don 
 ni  kun rdzob  tu  yari mi gnas  te / sems kyi rnam  pa las ma gtogs par de grub pa med pa'i phyir  'ro // cf. Note 
 (6) of Part II. 
(3)  MAV  P78134  D78b7 
 rgyu  dari 'brasbur gyur pa  yari //  ses pa 'ba'  zig kho na ste //  ran gis grub pa  gari yin pa // de ni  ses par 
 gnas pa yin // (MAK 91) 
(4) MAP  P78b4-79a4  D79a1-6 
 1...  -.1 
 ran  gis grub  pa'i  rio bo bor nas ses  pa'i  no bo  glan rtogs pa med do //  ran gis grub  pa'i  ran  bzin  yari  rmi lam 
 dan sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs  Min no // gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol  to  'dod pa  reams  ses pa las gud nayod 
 par  glue na  yari mig  la  sogs pa  blin  dui dus  mham pa  clan mi  mham  pa'i tshe4 rab  tu  he ba'i rgyu med 
 pas  rig par mi  'grub bo //de lta bas na de dag  myori ba ni tha dad pa ma yin pa'i  srion po  la' sogs pa'i rnam 
 pa  myori ba ste  /  myon ba'i  rio bo yin pas rmi lam  dan sgyu ma la sogs  Pa'is  myori ba  blin no //gal  te  ses  pa'i 
 rnam pa bsked  pa'i don  glan  zig 'bras bu las gud  na yod par rjes su dpog  na de lta na  yari  moon sum du 
 grub par ma gyur gyi rjes su dpag par zad do //de  lta na  yari 'di med par grub ste  /de ma thag pa'i rkyen  ries 
 par yod pa  dari / rdul phra mo  la sogs pa bkag pa'i phyir ro  //de ltar byas na stug  po  bkod pa  dari  /  dgoris pa  ries 
 Par  'grel pa  la sogs  pa las  'byuri ba thams cad  clan  'thun7 pa yin no //  lari kar  gcegs pa las / phyi rol gzugs ni 
 yod ma yin //  ran gi sems ni phyi rol  snari  //  9zes bstan pa 'di  yari legs par  Kad pa yin no  sham du sems o// 
 blo'il° mthu mi  churi ba  clan  lhag par  mo'n du brtson pa dag gis  kyari sems de la  gci  g  dari du ma'i  ran  bin du 
 brtags na / don dam par  shin  po mi  mthori bas /  yari dag  par  'dod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir / 
 1. D has no bor na 2. D has  blugs 3. P om. 4. D has tshe na 5. D has  srion po  la 6. D has 
 gzugs 7. D has  mthun 8. LAS. ch.X-489 ab:  bahirdla  nasti vai  rripain  drcyate bahih / 
 9. P has / 10. P has  blo  yi
 —  3  —
(5) 
(6)
                         A JC 
 nition, they cannot be perceived since there is no cause (hetu) of eyesight [, light and 
 attention,  etc.] which are placed close by and simultaneously in 'one. moment and also in 
 subsequent moments. That is why perceiving [such objects as color-form] is to perceive 
 images, such as the color-blue, inseparable from [cognition]. [Such object as color-form 
 which is assumed to exist  in the external  world] is like a perception of dream or illusion 
 in that it is product of perception. Even though you infer that object which produces 
 the images of cognition is independent ofeffect  [,  cognition], that inference is still nothing 
 more than an inference which cannot be ascertained by direct perception (pratyaksa). If 
  so, [such object as color-form] would be proven  to be a non-existence. The reasonis 
 that the immediately-preceding moment of mind (samanantara-pratyaya) is a certainty, 
 yet such object as atom (anu) is negated. 
 [Objection of  Vijfianavadin  J Accordingly, description i the  GahanavAha nd the  Sain-
  dhinirmocana [viz., the theory that all existences are products of mind-only  ( citta-matra)] 
  is reasonable in every cases. The  Lankavatara-sutra 
   color-form  ( rupa) does not exist in the external world, but it is our own mind that mani-
   fests in the external world. 
 This teaching has by no means any kind of error. 
 [Answer  :] When  (Buddhan bhagavantah) who possesses upreme wisdom, (ordinary 
 people  (prthag-jana) nd bodhisattvas) who make exertions examine the mind in terms 
 of intrinsic nature of unity or manifoldness  (ekaneka-svabhava), they by no means find 
 any  [eternal] essence. That is why we do not regard mind as absolute xistence. (The 
 .0.4) 
 theory of mind-only is reasonable to lead to higher truth.) Therefore, 
    (5. • • 
 Depending on mind-only, one must comprehend that [object] in the external world is non-
 existent. Abiding in the tenet [that all existences are devoid of intrinsic nature], one 
 .0.5) 
 should comprehend that even mind is also devoid of eternal  self." (MAK 92) 
 (6) - 
Moreover, after having cited the  Lankdvatara-sutra,  Santaraksita comments on the verse 
 sems  tsam  la ni brten nas su  phyi  rol  duos med ses par bya  //tshul 'dir brten nas de  la  yan  tu bdag 
med  ses par bya // (MAK 92) 
 MAV  P79b'  D79b' (=LAS, X-256, 257, 258. Bhk I.  p.2109-'4.  Mal  P171a2-4  D157a5-6 cf. Part I. 
Note  (56a)) 
sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi  rol don  la mi rtog  go  // 1  yan dag dmigs par gnas nas su // sems tsam las 
 kyan  in  tu bzla //  1. P has / 
sems tsam las ni bzlas nas  kyari //  snan ba med las  in  tu bzla //  snari med gnas  pa'i  rnal 'byor  pa // de yis 
theg pa chen por  mthori // 
 jug pa  lhun gyis grub  czri  zi // smon  lam dag gis rnam  Par  sbyans // ye  ses dam pa bdag med pa  //  snan ba med 
 la mi  mthori no //  1  1. Porn. 
MAV  P79b'  D79b4-5 (=LAS, X-592,  595) 
 —  4  —
                          Concerning the Yogacara-madhyamika 
                                                                                            (7) 
shown above, in which he quotes verses twenty-one and thirty-four of the Yuktisastika for 
                                                               the purpose of demonstrating his way of understanding the theory of mind-only  (citta-matra).
                                                                      (8) 
His comment begins with "It is also said in the following  portions."  Kamalas'ila then comm-
ents on the words of  §-antaraksita as follows: The theory of mind-only is stated from the 
                                 (9) 
standpoint of conventional truth. 
 Hence the theory of mind-only is acknowledged to be effective and reasonable from only 
the standpoint of conventional truth for  Kamala8-ila as well as  antaraksita.% In other words 
 Kamalagila as well as  Santaraksita regards it as acceptable for the purpose of leading to 
                                       (10)
highest truth of the Madhyamika. Mind (citta) is also devoid of intrinsic nature from the 
viewpoint of highest truth. In this respect their philosophical position differs from that 
of Vi  jrianavadin. The reason for this is that the theory of mind-only is conventional truth 
for  §antaraksita and  Kamalaila, while it is absolute ruth for the  Vijnanavadin. I  addition, 
 Kamalaga's philosophical position on this point can also be ascertained in his  Bhavandkrama. 
 (11...  "Ordinar
y people [mistakenly imagine] that such objects as color-form  ( rapa) exist inde-
   pendent  [of the mind in the external  world] because they have been attached since the 
   beginningless past to such objects as color-form which is unreal and false. However, in
 (7) MAV  P79b  5-  7  D79b  6 =  Yuktisastika  K° 21,34) Ichigo Masamichi,  Yugagyo-chuganha  OpFr. 
 rp koza Daijyo Bukkyo tail**{I, No.7. (1982)  Chugan  shin-  #R,T11,, p205. 
(8) MAV P79b5  D79b' 
 'dir  yan  gsuns pa / 
(9) MAP  P138b1-2  D129132 
 dir  yan  gsuns pa  zest bya ba ni  sews tsam kun rbzob  tosmra  ba'o // 1. P has  ks 
  SDNS  P332131-2 D 877-288a1  ( Tr.  Note(30),(69)) 
  skye ba dan 'gag pa la sogs la ninon par 2en pa gdul bya' la chad2 par lta ba. yons it span bdi p1 y' bcon2 
 ldan  'das kyis  'phags pa  dgons pa  nes par  'grel ba  la sogs pa  las rnams par  ks pa  la sogs pa  yod  pa  nid du bstan3 
  pa  gan yin pa de  yan don dam par ma yin no  2-es bya bar  gzun bar bya ste /
  1. P has ba 2. D has  khyad  3.D has brtan 
  cf. Mal P166b4-6  D153131-3,  P164a5-6  D1516' (SDNS IV Note(121)) and MAP  P132a5-6 D1246-7 (SDNS 
  IV Note (136)) 
 (10) cf. Part I. p28. 
(11) BhkIII  p615  -7  9 
 cittam  evanadikalikavitatharizpadyabhinivegavagt  svapnopalabhyamanarrtpadzPratibhasavad  balanain bahir 
  vicchinnam iva  rapadzPratiblzasanz  khyati/ tasmac cittamatram eva  traidhatukarn / sa  evain cittam eva sakala-
  prafhaptiM  nikitya (tatra pratyaveksya) ca  sarvadharmanaM svabhavah pratyaveksito bhavatiti cittasvabhavam 
  api pratyaveksate/ sa  evaM vicarayati / cittam api paramarthato mayavad nutpannam / yada  by  alikasvabha-
  varcipadyakaropagrahena cittam eva  citrakaranz pratibhasate tadasyapi  rupadivat tadavyatirekat  satyatvain kutra 
 (bha  vet ? yatha  cz) trakarataya  rapadayo(naikanekasvabhavah)tatha  cittam  api  tadavyatirekena  naikanekasvabha-
  yam / napi cittam  utpadyamanaM  kutakid agacchati / napi  nirudhyamananz kvacid gacchati / napi svaparo-
  bhayatah paramarthenasyotpado yuktah / tasman mayopamam eva cittam / yatha cittam  evain  sarvadharma 
 maydvat paramarthato' nutpannah / 
' cf. Bhk II.  p37"-438 
 —  5  —
     A  
   fact, the mind (citta) manifests by possessing color-form, just like in dreaming. 
     That is why all existences in the three realms  (traidhatuka) re product of the mind-
   only  (citta-mdtra). Thus after ascertaining and examining that the very mind produces 
   all kinds of designation  (prajnapti), he [viz.,  yogin] scrutinizes the nature of mind. This 
   is because [the examination of the nature of  mind] is tantamount to having examined all 
   existences. He examines as  follows: mind is also non-arising (anutpanna) just as illusion 
 (  maya) from the viewpoint of highest ruth. The reason for this is that whenever the 
   mind manifests with manifold images (citrdkdra) by having perceived images suchas 
   color-form which are  .characterized by their unreality, then how is the mind real since it 
   is also not detached [from manifold images] like color-form, etc.? Just as color-form, etc., 
   are devoid of intrinsic nature of either unity or multiplicity  (naikaneka-svabhdva) seeing 
   that they possess manifold images, so mind is also devoid of intrinsic nature of either 
   unity or multiplicity since it is not detached from manifold images. 
    The mind which is arising comes from nowhere, and themind which is perishing also 
   goes nowhere. It is not reasonable that [the  mind] is produced from itself, from others, 
   or from both [itself and others  ] from the point of view of highest ruth. Accordingly, 
   the mind is just like illusion. Just as the mind, all existences like illusion are also 
 -11) 
  nonarising from the viewpoint of highest truth." 
 Thus  Kamalagila compares the mind to illusion. Yet what kind of existence is illusion? He 
advocates as follows: 
 12.-  'What possesses no cause  (karana) even from the standpoint of conventional truth  (saM-
   vrtyd) is not produced even from the standpoint of conventional truth just as horns of a
   rabbit. On the other hand, what possesses [cause from the standpoint of conventional 
   truth]   although it is unreal (alika) from the viewpoint of highest truth  can still 
   be produced [from the standpoint of conventional truth,] just as illusion  (  mayd) or reflect-
   ion (pratibimba). Although illusion, etc., are of dependent origination  (pratityasamutpdda)
(12) Bhk I. p52822-5292 
 kiintu yasya  saMvrtyapi  karanaM nasti sa  sanwrtyapi notpadyate /  yatha  s'agavisanadi  / yasya  tuvidyate sa para-
 marthato  'liko  'pi samutpadyata ev / yatha mayapratibimbadi / na ca mayadeh  sainvrtya pratityasamutpade 
 paramarthato  vastutvaprasarigah / t sya vicaraksamatvat atah sarvam eva  mayopamaM jagat /
 Mal  P184a7-b1  D169a' 
 'on  kyan  gan  gari  la dus thams cad du kun rbzob tu'  yan rgyu  med pa de ni tha  shad du  yan mi skye ba  nid 
 de /  dper na ri  bon gi rva  la sogs pa lta  bu'o  //gari  la yod pa de ni don dam pa  rio bo  nid med  kyan skye ste 
 /2 dper na sgyu ma  dan gzugs  brnan  la sogs pa  lta  bu'o // sgyu ma  la sogs pa 'di rten  cin 'brel bar  'byun ba 
 yin  yan  ethos  po  nid du  thal ba ma yin  to / grags pa  clari tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir  o  //1. P has du 2. D om.
 —  6  —
                          Concerning the  Yogacara-madhyamika 
   from the standpoint of conventional truth, they still do not constitute existence (vastutva) 
   from the point of view of highest truth. The reason is that they do not hold up to  ana-
                                                                          . -.12) 
   lytic examination  (vicardksamatvat). Therefore, all existences are like illusion." 
 Taking all these together, we can safely conclude that the mind (citta)like illusion is not 
an absolute xistence but merely a conventional existence. Moreover, such external object 
as atom has already been rejected even by the mind which  is of conventional existence. 
Therefore the external object independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot  be  acknow-
ledged even from the standpoint of conventional truth. This is because objects in the exter-
nal world which the ordinary people regard to be independent of the mind are none 
other than manifestation f the mind (citta) which is a conventional existence. These facts 
clearly show the position of the Yogacara-madhyamika school. 
 In contrast o this Yogacara-madhyamika position, Bhavaviveka (c. A.D.500-570) as repre-
sentative of the Sautrantika-madhyamikas, advocates that the real meaning of mind-only indi-
cates not the rejection of the external world itself, but the rejection of the idea that an inde-
                                                                        (13) 
pendent entity as a thought-construction  ( vikalpa) exists from the mind. Candrakirti (c.  A.D. 
                                                                       (14)
600-650) of the  Prasangikas also holds the same view as  Bhavaviveka. Furthermore,  Bhava-
viveka regards, in terms of conventional truth, the existence of aggregation  (saincita) of the 
 
( 15) 
same kind of atoms such as a pot  as cause of cognition. 
 In addition   as I have previously discussed and concluded    Jnanagarbha (c. A.D. 
 700-760),  Santaraksita,  Kamalagla, and Haribhadra (c. A.D.800) took the same position in re-
futing 1) the atomic theory which the  Vaigesika,Vaibhasika and  Sautrantika saw as represent-
ing the existence of the external world independent of the mind and 2) the theory of the 
Satyakara-vadins and  Alikakara-vadins of the Yogacara school. On the basis of this common-
                                                                     (16) 
ality, they represent one lineage of the Yogacara-madhyamika school.
(13) (14) cf. II. The  Yogacara-madhyamika view of  Mind-only(citta-matra) of Part II. 
(15) See Kajiyama Yuichi  Chugan  shiso no Rekishi to Bunken ,y, eat0.) at 5e  a (History and 
 Bibliography of Philosophy ofMadhyamika),  Koza Daijo  Bukkyo, No.7 (Nov. 1982), Chugan  Shiso 
 *f.z.V 7,  rpm,E,Ag. pp.40-41. 
(16) See III,  IV  , V and Conclusion f Part II. 
 This method of refuting the theory of atoms and the  Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadin positions respectively 
 can also be found in the Tattvavatara-karika (TAK) of  Srigupta. 
 Karika 2 and 3 refute the theory of atoms, karika 4 refutes the theory of the Satyakara-vadin and karika 5 
 refutes the theory of the Alikakara-vadin. Moreover,  karika 14 and 15 explain that the doctorine of things 
 possessing some intrinsic nature is taught as skillful means  ( upaya ) to lead disciples ( vineya) to highest 
 truth of  sunyata. In addition Srigupta is said be a teacer of  Jnanagarbha. That is why we should hereafter 
 examine the philosophical relationship  Srigupta nd not only  Jnanagarbha but also  §antaraksita  K malagila,
 —  7  —
 A 
 Let us now summarize these pointsbelow. 
 According to  Kamalagila, all existences (sarvadharma) are included in the category of ma-
terial things  (rapin) and immaterial things  (arapin).  "Rrtpin"  stands for aggregate (skandha), 
the sphere of the senses (ayatana) and primary elements  ( dhatu), while  "arlipin "stands for 
              (17) 
the mind (citta). On the other hand, Haribhadra sums up all existences as those that are 
capable of effect  (arthakriya-karin), such category as the knowable  (jiieya-rffpa) and the know-
                 (18) 
ledge  (jnana-rn-pa).  In beginning with  their examination of  material things, they refute the 
                                                                                                    (191
theory of atoms (anu) as stated by the proponents of the existence of external world. They, 
then, define  manifestation of such objects as color-form  (rupa) to be product of the  mind-
                 (29) 
only  (citta-mdtra). 
       (21.••  "Therefore
, [the Yogin] would also examine material things  (rupin) in order to obtain the 
  understanding that all existece is devoid of eternal self  (dharmanairatmya). How could 
  these [material things] be a reality independent of the mind (cttta) seen from the viewpoint 
  of highest ruth  (paramarthasat)? That is why the very mind which possesses the ap-
   pearance of color-form, etc., manifests just as [objects] appear while dreaming. (The 
  Yogin), in exploring (material things) from the point of view of atom  (paramanugah), does 
   not regard atoms [as reality] when he analyzes atoms into actions (bhaga). (The Yogin), 
   who does not regard [atoms as reality], is released from thought-construction (vikalpa) 
   as to whether [material  things] are real or not. He, then, comprehends that [all exist-
 and Haribhadra. cf. Note (23) (30) 
 cf..Ejima Yasunori  iI chugan-shiso n  tenkai ittl,q„itT„ta)1RIM  pp218-220. Japanese Tr. of TAK. 
(17)  Bhk.  I.  p20212-13 
 dvividha bhava  rap*  'rapind ca / 
 Bhk.  III.  p5  12-  11 
 rapyarapibhedena ca  -saMksepat  s rvadharmasaingrahah / tatra  rapaskandhasaMgrhita  rupinah / vedanadiska 
 ndhasvabhavaarapinah / 
 Bhk.II.  pp37  24  -393 
 chos la bdag med pa yan 'di  ltar bsgom par bya ste / chos  2-es bya ba ni mdor bsdus na  phuiss  po  lisa  dais / skye 
 mched bcu  gnis  dais / khams bco brgyad o // de  la  phuis po  dais / skye mched  ais / khams  dais gzugs can 
 gais dag yin pa de dag ni don dam par  na sems kyi rnam pa las  gud na med do // 
(18) AAPV  W.p6247-12  V.4582-5 
 nasiddho'yanz hetuh yasmat  preksavatain pravrtteh prayojanavattaya v ptatvat rthakriyayogyapadarthavisayo 
 vicaryah anyatha  arthakriyarthinain  puinsam asadarthapadarthavicaraih  kint  prayojanam ity  arthakri  yakari  bha-
 vo'bhyupagantavyah I sa  canyonyavyavacchedarupatvaj  jneyaraPo  vabhayej  frianarapo  yeti vikalpah / 
 See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, pp.37-38. 
(19) See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, p.38-46 and footnote concerning MAV and MAP. 
(20) See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, pp.46-48 and footnote concerning  MAV. 
(21) Bhk.III.  p.65-11 
 tato  rupino'Pi dharman dharmanairatmyadhigamaya vicarayet / kim ete cittavyatirekena  paramarthasantah 
 sthitah / ahosvic cittam eva  raPadinirbhasain  svaPnavasthayain pratibhasavat pratibhasata iti / sa tan  parama-
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   ence] which belongs to the three world  (traidhatuka) is a product of mind-only  (citta-
                                                        -.21) 
   matra). There is nothing else." 
 After this  Kamalagla and Haribhadra go on to examine mind as an immaterial things. As a 
result they lead to the conclusion that mind is also devoid of intrinsic nature like illusion  (maya) 
                                                           (22)
from the point of view of highest of the  Ma.dhyamika. 
 Furthermore, according to  Kamalagila, these examinations are conducted by the Yogins 
who   out of their great compassion  (maha-karuna) toword ordinary people   aim to 
remove ordinary people's inverted and erroneous conceptions which regard external world or 
the mind to be of real  existence, and to lead them to highest truth that all existence is devoid 
                                    
(23) 
of intrinsic nature  (  nihsvabhdva). 
 This position canalso be traced back to  Jnanagarbha. 
( 21.••    "After [the Blessed One  (Bhagavat  )] with compassion  (karund) observed a person who 
   was bound by thought-construction, he proclaimed the teachings of bondage and liberation 
   (moksa) according to the doctrine of mind-only  (citta-n2dtra), etc. (SDK.  32) 
    The Blessed One, who thoroughly examined [the  law] of deed (karma)and its effect 
   and was the incarnation of compassion, observed sentient being bound by iron fetters, 
   that is, thought-construction i  the prison of transmigration  (sarnsara  ). Then, with the 
   mind that observes things as they really are, he removed all attachments with  regardto
 nuk nirapayan  paramanunkc ca bhagacah pratyaveksamano nopalabhate / tatha  canupalabhamanas tesv asti-
 nastitvavikalpan nivartayati /  cittamatram ca traidhatukam vatarati nanyatha / 
(22) Bhk. III.  pp.615-79 
 cittam  evanadikalikavitatharapadyabhinivccavacat  s apnopalabhyamanarupadipratibhasavaa'  balanain bahirvicc-
 hinnam iva  rapadzPratibhasaM khyati / tasmac cittamatram eva traidhatukam / sa  eva  4i cittam eva  sakalapra-
 jhaptiin  niscitya tatra pratyaveksya ca  sarvadharmanain svabhavah  pratvaveksito bhavatiti c ttasvabhavam api 
 pratyaveksate / sa  evain vicarayati /  cittam api paramarthato mayavad  anutpannam /  vada  by  alikasvabhava-
 rapadyakaropagrahena cittam eva  citrakarain pratibhasate  tadasvapi  rupadivat tadavvatirekat  s tvatvaM kutra 
 bhavet yatha citrakarataya rupadayo naikanekasvavah  tat a cittam api  tadavvatirekena naikanekasvabhavam / 
 napi cittam  utpadyamanain  kutakid  agacchati  / napi  nirudhyamanaM kvacid gacchati /  svaparobhavatah  pa-
 ramarthenasvotpado yuktah / tasman mayopamam eva cittam /  yatha  cittam  evaM sarvadharma  maya  vat 
 paramarthato' nutpannah / 
 cf. Bhk.II.  pp.39"-431 
(23) Bhk.III.  p.514-17 
  tatra  bald  bhaaadigrahabhinivekid  ozParyastadhiyah  sanisare paribhramanti / tesam  viparvasapanavanava tesu 
  ca  mahakarunaM  mukhikrtya  nispannacamatho yogi  tattvadhigamava toto  vipas-yanain bhavayet / 
(24) SDV  D13a' 
 thugsrje'i bdag hid de hid  kyis  //de hid rtogs pas  bciris pa  gzigs  nos ni  11  sems  tsam  la sogs  bve brag  gis/:  bci  fis 
  pa thar pa bstan pa mdzad // bcom  ldan  das las  dari  'bras bu  mkhyen pa thugs  rje'i  ran  bzin gvi sku  cande 
  hid kyis  'khor ba'i btson rar  'gro ba rtog pa'i  lcags grog is  bcins pa  la gzigs  nas./ bsani  pa  ji  lta ba  bin du 
 phun  Po  dan khams dan skye  inched an / sems tsam dan / chos thams cad  bdag med par bstan  pa'i rim gvis 
 drios  por  'dzin pa ma lus par  sel bar mdzad  cin /  'gro ba  la  bcins pa  dan  Mar pa bstan pa  mdzad o //
 —  9  --
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   existence  (bhava) based on doctrines examined in the following order with respect to the 
   aggregates (skandha), spheres of the senses  (dyatana), primary elements  (dhatu) up to 
   [the doctrines  of] mind-only  (citta-matra) and all existence as being devoid of eternal 
   self  (andtman). He, then, taught sentient beings living in transmigration the doctorines 
                                              -.24) 
   of bondage and liberation. 
 (24  1) 
 Thus, Kamalaga isindebted toJnanagarbha as well as to §antaraksita. 
 II. The  Vijii  dna Theory of  Kamalagila and Haribhadra 
 Let us examine  Kamala§i-la's  vigidna theory according tohis  Sarvadharmanihsvabhava-
siddhi. 
 (25•-    "Ordinary people still hypostatize (samdropa) from the viewpoint of highest truth the 
   arising of such things as illusion  (mayd) which are acceptable only so long as they are 
   not examined carefully  (avicdraikaramya), and which are produced by dependent  origin-
                                                     
••.26) 
   ation  (pratityasamutpanna)." 
 Moreover, 
       (26.-    "Those things which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully, 
   that is, produced by dependent origination (pratityasamutpanna) have a dependent 
 -.26) 
   nature  (paratantrasvabhava)." 
 Taking all these together, illusion  (mdyd) is tantamount o that which is acceptable only so
(24-1) 
 In addition  Rianagarbha nd  Kamalagila share a common characteristic in citing the  Lankavatara-sutra and 
 Prajiiaparamita-sutra when they examine xistence in the sense of conventional truth and highest ruth. 
 SDV  D9a3-5 
 mdolas ji skad du /  dnos rnams skye ba kun rdzob  to // dam  pa'i don du ran  Min med // ran  bun med  la 
 khrul pa  gan // de ni  yan dag kun rdzob  'dod  //   
 mdo las ji skad du / rab 'byor phyin ci log magtogs par  gan  la gnas nas byis pa so  so'i  skye bo rnams las  mnon 
 par  'du byed par  'gyur  ba'i  drios po bden pa ni skra'i rtse mo'i cha  as gzugs  pa'i tshad tsam  yari med do  ies 
 gsuns pa  lta bu'o // 
 =Mal P168a  3-5  D154b4-5, SDNS  P331b8  D287b'-' (cf. SDNS IV  Note- (115)) 
  =LAS  X-429, Ad.  p.1233-5 
 (25) SDNS  P331b'  D287a° 
 sou ma  biz.  n du ma brtags na dga'  ba rten  cin 'brel bar  'byun ba'i  duos po thams cad  la byis pa rnams kyis 
 don dam par  skye  be  la sogs par sgro  'dogs pa 
 cf. SDNS. IV Note (113) 
(26) SDNS  P332a4-5 D287b4 
 di  ltar ma brtags par grags pa  drios po  rnams kvi rten  cin 'brel bar  'byuri  ba'i  no bo  nid  gan yin pa de  ni 
 glare gyi  dban gi no bo  nid de / 
 cf. SDNS. IV Note (118) 
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long as it is not examined carefully, that which is produced by dependent origination (pra-
                                                                               (27) 
 tityasamutpanna), and that which has a dependent nature  (paratantrasvabhdva). 
 In addition,  Kamalas-Ha regards illusion  (mayd) as both mind (citta) or existence as seen 
from the conventional truth in this  way  :
 (2s••-   "Mind  (citta) is also non-arising (anutpanna) just as illusion  (  maya) from the viewpoint 
 —28) 
   of highest truth is non-arising." 
 (29.-    "What possesses [cause  (karana) from the standpoint of conventional truth] although 
   it is unreal  (alika) from the viewpoint of highest truth can still be produced [from 
   the standpoint of conventional  truth,  ] just as illusion  (mdyd) or reflection (pratibimba). 
   Although such things as illusion are of dependent origination  (pratityasamutpada) from 
   the standpoint of conventional truth, they still do not constitute existence  (vastutva)from 
   the point of view of highest truth. The reason is that they do not hold up to analytic 
   examination  (vicardksamatvdt). Therefore, all existences are like  illusion.  "
 (30.••  "The Blessed One proclaimed in the  S
andhinirmocana[-satra], etc., that such things as 
   cognition  (virfidna) are a reality in order to have disciples (vineya) who adhere to arising  
(  utpacia), ceasing (nirodha) and so forth discard nihilistic ideas. The intention of this 
 -.30) 
   teaching must be understood not from the viewpoint of highest truth." 
Thus  Kamalagila regards that which is acceptable only so long as it is not examined carefully 
 (avicaraikaramya) as an existence in the sense of  conventional truth, that is, illusion  (mdyd), 
mind (citta) etc. That is, those which are produced by dependent origination (pratityasmu-
tpanna), and those which have a dependent nature  (paratantrasvabhava). 
 This idea can be traced back to  kdrikd sixty-four in the  Madhyamakdlainkdra (MAK) of 
 Santaraksita. 
(27) cf. Mal  P162b6-7  D150a4-5 (SDNS IV (118) 
 de  la  duos po ma brtags na grags  pa'  ji  ltar  snap ba sgyu ma  bun du brten nas  byun ba  gan yin pa de ni 
 glan gyi  dban gi  no  bo  'hid yin no // de  yari kun rdzob  to sgyu ma  buin du  gian gyi  rk  yen gyi  dban gis skye'i 
 / bdag  nid kho na ni ma yin pas skye ba no bo  nid med pa  nid  du  ream par  giag  stet / 1.Pom. 2.P has  192ag 
 (28) Bhk III.  pp.621 
 cittam api paramarthato mayavad nutpannam / 
(29) Bhk I.  pp.21823-2192 
 yasha  to vidyate sa  paramarthato'liko'pi samutpadyata ev /  yatha mayapratibimbadi / na ca  mayadeh  sainvrtya 
 pratttyasamutpade ramarthato  vastutvaprasangah / t sya vicaraksamatvat / atah sarvam eva  mayopamanz 
 jagat  /
 Mal P1840-b'  D169a' 
 gan  la yod pa de ni don dam pa  no bo  nid med kyan skye ste dper na sgyu ma dan gangs  brnan  la sogs pa 
 lta  bu'o // sgyu ma  la sogs pa  'di rten  cin 'brel bar  'byun ba yin  yari  drios po  nid  du  thal  ba ma yin  to / 
  1. D om. 
(30) SDNS  P332b'  D287137-288a1 cf. Note (9),(69). Note (121) of SDNS IV. 
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 (31...    "[We] regard that which is acceptable only so long as it is not examined carefully (avicd-
   raikaramya) as being existences in the sense of conventional truth  (sainvrti) which have 
   the nature of arising  ( utpada) and ceasing (nirodha) and the power to produce effects 
 -.31) 
 (arthakriydsa.martha)." 
 On the other hand, Haribhadra employs this idea to distinguish the Satyakara and  Alikakara-
vadin philosophical position in terms of image  (dkara). 
 (32.-    "Yogacaras considor that an entity  (bhdva) consists of cognition  (jfizdndtmaka). Within 
 [Yogac-aras], [philosophical positions] differ as  follows: 
   One regards images  (dkdra) [of cognition  (jnana)] as real (tdttvika), the other regards 
   them as those which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully  (avi-
                                                                           -32) 
 cdraikaramya) such as reflection (pratibimba), etc." 
 According to this discrimination of the Satyakara and  Alikakara-va-din positions made by 
Haribhadra, we find that Satyakara-vadin acknowledges that images of cognition are real even 
from the viewpoint of highest truth. On the other hand,  Alikakara-vadin acknowledges that 
images of cognition are real only from the standpoint  of conventional truth  (sainvrtya). It 
goes without saying that cognition (  vzjiidna or  jnana) itself is real from the viewpoint of high-
est truth for the Satyakara-vadin and  Alikakara-vadin. However,  Kamalaga and Haribhadra 
regard cognition  (vijnana)  possessing images  (dkdra) as a conventional existence. This is 
 (33 
also true for Jnanagarbha and §antaraksita. Therefore, all of them point out that the view of 
the Satyakara-vadin ca not avoid the incompatibility of unity (eka) and multiplicity (aneka) 
 
(34, 
that exists between cognition (  vigidna or  jnana) and images  (  /gam) respectively. Concern-
ing the view of the  Alikakara-vadin, they point out that nondual cognition  (advayajiidna) as 
absolute truth, which is devoid of images of the perceived and the perceiver  (grahya-grdhaka-
                                                                         (35)
 &bra), cannot be proven to have a relationship of cause and effect. 
(31)  MAV  P681o2-"  D70b' 
 ma brtags gcig  put  hams dga'  iin  //  skye  dah  Jig  pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rnams  kyi2  //  rah 
     kun  rdzob pa yin rtogs //
  1. D has  'wiz" 2. D has  kyis 
 (33) AAPV  W62614-16  V45915-'6 
 inangtMak0  bhavo  yogacarair  bhvupagamyate / tatrapi  kim  to akaras tattvika eva kim  va pratibimbadivad  av-
 icamikaramyah iti vikalpah / 
 See pp.47-48 ofTranslation ofAAPVof Part I. 
(33) See Note (9) (10) (11) and II. The  Yogacara-madhvamika view of Mind-only  (citta-matra) of Part II. 
(34) See pp.17-21 (3.III.A. The focus of the refutation f the view of  Satyakara-vadin) and IV.  Conclusion f Part I. 
 See IV.  Jhanagarbha's refutation fthe  Satvakaravadin position of Part II. 
 (35) See pp.23-27  (3.111. B. The. focus of the refutation f the view of the Alikakara-vadin a d IV.  Conclusion of 
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 III. The Yogacara-madhyamika Refutation  of the Positions of the Satyakara and 
 Alikakara-vadins. 
 III.1. The focus of the refutation of the views of the  Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadins. 
 The basic method and contents of refuting the views of the  Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadin 
                                                      (36)
are common to the  Satyadvayavibhanga-vrtti (SDV) of Jnanagarbha, the  Satyadvayavidhanga-
  (36)  (37) 
 Paniikd (SDP) and the  MadhyamakaaMkara-vrtti (MAV) of  S'antaraksita, the  Madhyamakd-
      
( 37) (38) 
 lainkdra-paiijikd (MAP) and the  Madhyamakdloka-  (Mal)  'of  Kamalagila, and the  Abhisarna-
                                                   (39) 
 ydlainkdralokd  Pragiaparamitdvyakhyd (AAPV) of Haribhadra. 
 In refuting the views of the  Satyakara-vadin; they point out the incomatibility of unity 
(eka) and multiplicity (aneka) that exist between cognijion  (vzjil  dna) and images  (akdra). 
 Kamalagila nd Haribhadra, then, show that the  Satyakaravadin position is in contradiction 
with direct  perception (pratyaksa) since direct perception  that should be expected to be 
devoid of imaginary  thought-construction  ( vikalpa) becomes involved with imaginary thought-
construction. On the other hand, in refuting the views of  Alikakara-vadin,  Kamalagila nd 
Haribhadra show that the nondual cognition  (advayainana) being devoid of the images of the 
perceived and perceiver  (graya-grahakdkara) cannot be proven by inference  (anumana) 
such as (1) a relation of identity  (svabhava), (2) effect  (kdrva) or (3) non-perception  (anupalab-
dhi). Moreover, it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity  (tadatiii_va) nor 
a causal relation  (tadutpatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images  (alikdkdra). 
In light of these refutations,  Kamalagila and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to 
either the  Satyakara-vadin or the  Alikakara-vadin. This is also true for  Jnanagarbha and  Sa-
ntaraksita. 
 Let us now briefly review  Kamalaslia's method involved in the refutation of the  Satyakara 
and  Alikakara-vadins discussed in his  Bildvanakrama (BhK). After then, I will provide the 
translation of the details of  Kamalagila's refutation of the  Alikakara-vadin position in his
 of Part I. 
 See V.  Inanagarbha's refutation  ofthe view of  Alilealearavadin  of Part II. 
 (36) See IV.  fionagarbha's refutation of the  Satyakaravadin position and V.  .Thanagarbha's  ref:illation of the  rim 
 of  Alikakaravadin of Part II. 
(37) See Footnote  (201)—(208),(211)—(213) and  (215)—(217) of Part I. and Tr of AAPV  of Part II. 
(38) See pp.17-27, especially Footnote (32), (52) and (53) of Part I. See  111.3.  KanialaSila's refutation of the  Alikaka 
 ra-vadin position in his  madhyamakalokanama of Part III. 
(39) See pp.46-58 (A Translation of  AAPV) of Part I and VII. A Translation of  AAPV  of Part II. 
  See Conclusion Part I and Part II.
— 13 —
                     A  X * 
 111.2.  Kamalasila's refutation of the  Satyakara and  Alikakara7vadin positions in his 
 Bhavandkrama, 
 111.2.1. The refutation of the Satyakara-vadin position 
 (40-  "The Blessed One (Bhagavat) also declared  [in the  Aryalanka-vatdra]. 
 (40-1..• 
   color-form  (  rapa) by no means exists in the external world, so that [actually] it is our 
 -40-1) 
   own mind that is seen in the external world. 
    Therefore, it is also not reasonablethat these [immaterial things (arupin)] possess 
   unitary nature  (ekasvabhava) in that they manifest having manifold images  (citrdkara) 
   such as the color blue and having images of the perceived and the perceiver (grdhya-
   grahakakara). Manifold nature is unsuitable for unity since the latter is contrary to the 
   former. When the unitary nature of something [immaterial] cannot be established, its 
   manifold nature is also untenable, since manifoldness is none other than the aggregate 
              ...40) 
„ 
   of unity. 
     The reason for my regarding this description as a refutation of the  Satyakara-vadin 
                                                                                       (41)
   position is that it is in accordance with the description found in the  Mal of  Kamala§ila 
 (42) 
   and in the AAPV of Haribhadra. 
 111.2.2. The refutation of the  Alikakara-vadin position 
       (43...    "On the other hand
, if [you] acknowledge that these unreal (alika) images (dkdra)   
   such as the color-form   manifest for sure, then cognition (vijiidna) would also be un-
   real. The reason is that cognition cannot be separated from the nature [of unreal images]. 
   This is because on other nature of cognition apart from illumination on its own can exist. 
(40) Bhk I.  p20310-16 
 uktainca bhagavata / 
 (40  1•••  .••40 1) 
 bahirdha nasti  vai  rupam  svacittain  drgyate bahih / iti / 
 tato§ ca niladicitrakaranirbhasataya  groh grahakakaranirbhasataya naik svabhava mi yuktah / na  caikasya-
 nekarapata yuktimati ekanekavirodha / ekasya kasyacit  svabhavasyasiddhav  anekarupatapy  yuktimati  ekasa-
 maharapatvad anekasya / 
(40-1) LAS X-489 ab 
 •ahirdha  nasti vai  rapain  svacittaM  drcyate vahih /
(41) See  pp17-21 and Footnote (32) ofPart I. 
(42) See p48  [II-1-A] of Part I. 
(43) Bhk I.  pp.20316-2042 
 athavatatralika  evami  rapadava akarah pratibhasanta ity  abhyupagamyate  / t davijrianam  apy  alikam  prapnoti 
 /  viiiianasya t tsvarapavyatirekat /  na hi  svayahl  prakagamanarapatavyatirekenanyad  vijii asya rupam asti /
 svayain ca na nirbhasante  rupadayah /  tesain ca viiiianasvarapapannanam  likatve  sarvam eva  vzjilianam  ali-
 kern  abhyupetaM  syat / tasman  mayopamain ca vijiianam ity  uktain bhagavata/  tasmad ekanekasvabhavaciTtn-
 yatvena  pararnarthato  7ika  evdmi sarvabhava iti  nikitarn etat /
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 No other nature [of images] such as the color-form [apart from illumination on its own] 
 can exist. If these [images] which are involved in the nature of cognition are unreal, it 
 would be acknowledged that all cognition is also unreal. 
 [Conclusion:  ] That is why the Blessed One proclaimed that "cognition is like illusion 
 (mdyd)" Therefore, it is ascertained that all these existences  (sarvabhava) [viz., of both 
 material things  (  rapin) and immaterial things (arupin)] are definitely unreal (alika) from 
 the viewpoint of highest truth since they are devoid of intrinsic nature of unity and  mul-
                                                          -.43) 
 tiplicity  (  ekdneka-svabhavaanyatva)."
 111-3.  KamalaSila's refutation of the theory of the  Alikakara-vadin of the Yogacara 
    School in his  Madhyamakaloka.
[Objection of the  Alikakara-vadin:  ]
        (44... 
   The distinctions of [the laksanas of] arising (  utpada), etc., are established by means of 
 cognition  (jiidna) which manifests as a dichotomy [between the perceived and the per-
 ceiver  (grahya-grahaka)], not only by self-cognition  (svasainvedana) [ s a nondual cogni-
 tion (advaya  jiidna) which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver 
 (grdhya-grdhakdkara)]. 
   As the manifestation f dichotomy is also unreal  (alika), that which has the nature 
 -44) 
 established by it is also none other than unreal. 
[Answer of the  Yogacara-madhyamika:  ] 
 (45.- 
   If all existence which has the nature of arising  ( utpdda), etc., is established by way of 
 manifesting as a cognition which is unreal, how can it exist from the point of view of 
 highest truth  (paramarthatas)?
 See III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the  Alikakara-vadin and Footnote (52), (53) of Part I. See 
 Conclusion of  111.3. of Part III and  11.2.B.2. II.2.B.2.3. of SDNS IV. 
 (44)—(60)  Mal P180b4-182b8  D165b6-167b7 
 [Objection of the Alikakara-vadin: ] 
 (44... 
 gari  yari skye ba  la sogs  pa'i  rnam par dbye ba  ni  ghis su  snari  ba'i  ses pa kho nas byed  kyi / ran rig pa  tram 
 gyis ni ma yin no //  ghis su  snan ba  yari brdzun pa'i  phyir des rnam par  gtag  pa'i  no bo  van brdzun pa kho 
 -.44) 
 na'o 
 
[  Answer of the Yogacara-madhyamika : ] 
 (45... 
 2es bya ba  la sogs pa smras pa de  la  yari brjod par bya ste / gal  te chos thams  cad'  skye ba  la sogs  pa'i chos  hid 
 ,Ces pa  brdzun pa'i  no bor  snari bas  rnam par  g2ag2 pa'i no bo  yin na ni  de  ji ltar  'di dag don  dam  par  yod par 
 gyur  (D166<)  gnis su  snari ba  yari brdzun pa hid yin na ni  ges pa'i  no bo  gari don dam par srid par 'gvur ba 
 Van ci  2ig lus /  .ces pa de kho na  hid  gzuri ba  dari  'dzin pa'i  rnam pa  dari  bral ba  gtan ni tshu  rol  mthori  be 
 rnams kyis  yari dag par  myori ba med de / thams cad de kho na hid  mthori  ba"  hid du  thal bar  'gyur o  //de 
                                                                                                                                                               
• •••15) 
 ni  rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas  ries pa  yari ma yin  te / de  lta rtags hid ma grub  pa'i phyir ro //
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                          A -t 
 If the manifestation of the dichotomy [of cognition] is also unreal, how can the other 
kind of cognition, which is able to exist from the viewpoint of highest truth, exist? This 
true cognition which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot 
be completely perceived by  ordinary people. [If it were possible for them,] everyone 
 would attain the truth. 
[Self-cognition as nondual cognition] cannot be proven by means of inference  (anumana), 
 -.45) 
for such a logical reason (hetu) is inadmissible (asiddha). 
This is  because  :
(46... 
Inference which is formulated with a logical mark of identity  (svabhdva-linga) c nnot be 
established because the very identity [between self-cognition asa nondual cognition and 
 -46) 
its internal object] must be proven. 
Inference which is formulated with the logical mark of effect  (karya) cannot be establi-
shed because it is impossible that something nondual (advaya) and anything else can 
have a cause and effect relationship with each other, and because [nondual cognition] 
cannot be ascertained by means of a sense  organ (indriya).  There can be no other 
 effect  (kdrya) independent of [nondual cognition], for according to your theory, [a self-
cognition of] nonduality would be taken as an effect, however [self-cognition] itself should 
[first] be proven to have a cause and effect relationship. This also cannot be proven by 
means of a valid means of cognition  (pramdna). Just as the  manifestation  f dichotomy 
[viz., images of the perceived and the perceiver] is equivalent o the horns of a rabbit 
[viz., non-existent] [according to your theory,] it  cannot be an effect. 
 How can the cause and effect relationship be proven by means of direct perception 
(pratyaksa) nd nonperception (anupalabdhi)? This is  because nothing can be perceived 
 
.•47) 
by means of a cognition of nonduality from the point of view of highest truth.
         (.16••• 
 I.  di ltar re  2ig  ran  b2in  gyi  nags las  bvun bas rjes su dpag  pa  ni  mi srid  de' / de'i ran  b2in  nid bsgrub 
                                              
•••16) 
par  bva ba yin  pa'i  phyir ro 
       (47.•• _ 
2. 'bras') bu'i  nags  kyan ma yin  te /  gnis su med  pa  dan  6  yan  Than cig rgyu  Bari  'bras bu'i  (P181a)  clnos 
 Por ma grub pa'i phyir  te / de ni  dban pos mi sod pa'i phyir ro // de las ma gtogs  pa'i 'bras bu  g2an yod  pa 
 yari ma yin  te /  'di  ltar  khyed  kvi  ltar na  gnis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur  'gyur ba  2ig  na de  nid  bsgrub par 
bya ba  nid  kyi skabs yin pa'i  phyir de van tshad mas grub pa ma yin  no  1/  gnis su  snail ba gan yin pa de ni ri 
 bon gi  rva dan  'dra  ba'i  Asir- 'bras bu ma yin no //  gan gis na  rnrion sum  dan mi dmigs pas sgrub pa  rgyu 
 dan  'bras bu'i  duos po  'grub par  'gyur ba don dam par  gnis su med pa'i  ges pas  kyan  'go'  yan  'dzin  pa med 
   -.471 
 do  //
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3. Nonperception  (anupalabdhi) is not that which proves the reality [of nondual cognition] 
 •••48) 
   because it is that which proves negation (pratisedha). 
3-a. 
 (49... 
 [Objection  :  ] There is surely a valid means of cognition  (pramdna) that can prove [the 
   reality of nondual cognition]. 
   This is  because : 
 [Major:] Whenever A is contrary to B by nature, A is devoid of B. e.g. warmth which is 
   contrary to cold is devoid of cold. 
 [Minor: The nature of cognition [viz., reality] is contrary to the duality [images of the 
   perceived and the perceiver  (grahya-grahakakara).] 
 [Conclusion: The nature of cognition is devoid of  duality.] 
 [This inference] is based on the principle of the perception of what is incompatible with a 
   pervader  (vyapaka-viruddhopalabdhi). T e logical reason (hetu) in this case does not 
   lead to the fallacy of the impossibility of the basis  (asraydsiddhi). 
     A subject (charmin) that perceives images uch as pleasure and displeasure, that is, 
   cognition with the nature of perception is, in general, accepted. [The logical reason 
   (hetu) [of this inference] is also not inadmissable (asiddha), for the image of the perceiv-
   er  (grahakakara) which is constructed epending upon the image of the perceived  (grd-
   hydkdra) is also devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhava) s the image of the perceived  
(  grahydkdra) is devoid of intrinsic nature because it is devoid of the nature of either 
 .•49) 
   unity (eka) or multiplicity (aneka). 
 (50••• 
3-b. All existence does not come to be non-existent as a result of this, for [the images of the
(48.•..•••48) 
3. mi  dmigs pa  yan dgag pa sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // gal  to  'di  sham  - du 
3—a.  [ Objection : ] 
 (49... 
de sgrub par byed pa'i  tshad ma ni yod pa  hid de /  'di  ltar  'ga'  2ig  gan gi no bo  nid dan  'gal ba de ni de'i no 
bos dben pa  yin pa yin  te / dper na  gran ba'i no bo  la gnod pa'i dro ba  gran ba'i no bo  hid  kyis dben pa lta bu 
yin  la / rtogs pa'i no bo'i chos can  yan  ghis kyi no bo  nid  la gnod pa yin pas  khyab par byed pa  'gal ba  dmigs 
pa yin no //  gtan tshigs  g2i ma grub pa  yan ma yin  te / spyir dga' ba  dan mi dga' ba  la sogs pa'i rnam pa 
 hams su  myon  ba'i chos can rnam par  ges pa  2es bya ba rtogs  pa'i no bo grub  pa'i phyir ro // ran gi no bo ma 
grub pa  he  id  kyan ma yin  te / gzun  ba'i rnam pa gcig dan du ma'i no bo  nid dan bral ba'i sgo nas no bo nid 
                                                                                                                                                                      ••.49) 
 -med pa  (01668)  hidkyis de  la  ltos nas rab  tu brtags  pa'i  'dzin  pa'i  rnam pa  yan no bo  hid med  pa'i  phyir ro // 
3—b. 
(50••• 
thams cad  duos po med par yan  that ba yan ma yin  te  /bred  pa po dan las kyi no bo kho na  la bltos8 pa  tsam 
las  he bar brtags pa'i no bo yin pa'i phyir brdzun pa  'be'  2ig  tu zad kyi / bdag  hid ni ma yin no  sham  du  sems 
•••511) 
na
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   perceived and the perceiver  (grdhya-grahakdkara)] are none other than unreal (aUka) and 
   nonsubstantial in that they are conceptually constructed depending upon only the  [con-
                                                                                            -.50) 
   ventional] relation of agent (kartr) and action (karman). 
 (51••. 
 [Answer j Your statement is not reasonable. 
 3-a-1. If you want, in general, to prove only that [cognition] is devoid of duality (viz.,  gra-
   hya-grdhaka) from the viewpoint of highest ruth (paramdrtha) [viz., as absolute negat-
   ion  (prasajya-rupa)], then it would only prove what is already proven  (siddha-sadhana). 
   We  [Yogacara-madhyamika] alsoadvocate that [cognition] is detached (vivikta) from 
   any intrinsic nature because this duality is unreal  (alika)  from the viewpoint of highest 
 -.51) 
   truth. 
 (52.- 
3-a-2. If you want to prove that an individual cognition is devoid of images  (akara) from the 
   viewpoint of highest truth, the relative negation  (paryuddsa-rapa), it also would only 
   prove what is already proven  (siddhasddhana). This is because we  [Yogacara-madhya-
   mika] also advocate that all kinds of cognition are non-existent from the point of view of 
   highest truth and devoid of dual real images since all existences are non-arising  (anutpa-
                                                                              --52) 
   tti) from the point of view of highest truth. 
 (53.• 
3-a-3. If you want to prove that the subject  (dharmin) of cognition  (Friana) is devoid of 
   dual images [viz.,  grOhya-grahakdkara] nd that it  is,a real existence [at the same time], 
   the logical reasoning  [Of this inference] leads to inconclusiveness  (anaika-ntika) because 
   the invariable concomitance (anvaya) with regard to the example  (drstanta) would not 
   be proven. The reason why is that it cannot be proven from the point of view of  high-
[ Answer : ] 
(51-• 
de  yan rigs pa ma yin  te / 
 3—a-1. 
gal  te  spyir don dam par  ghis kyis dben  pa tsam Zig sgrub par  'atod na ni de'i tshe grub pa sgrub pa  hid de / 
                                                                                                                         -.51) 
kho bo cag  kyan don  (1,181b) dam par  ghis brdzun pa'i  phyir dben par  'atod pa  hid do // 
3—a-2. 
(52••• '
on  te ma yin pa'i  no  bo'i  s don dam  pa'im sgo nas rnam par  ses pa  hid kyi  rnam pa  dari bral ba  hid du sgrub 
par  'clod na ni de'i tshe  yan grub pa sgrub pa  hid de / kho bo cag  kyan don dam par chos thams cad ma skyes 
 pa'i phyir  ses pa thams cad don dam par med pa  la  ghis kyi rnam pa  yen dag pa  dan bral bar  'clod pa'i phyir  -.52) 
 ro  // 
3—a-3. 
(53-• 'on  te  ses pa  2es bya ba'i chos can  la ghis  dan bral ba hid dan /  dnos po'i  no  .bo  hid ghi ga  yan sgrub  par  'dod 
na ni de'i tshe dpe  la rjes su  'gro ba ma grub pas gtan  tshi  gs ma  ries pa  hid yin  te / phyi'i don gyi  no bo gran 
 -.53) 
ba  dari / tsha ba dag  yan dag par ma grub  pa'i phyir ro // 
                                   — 18 —
                         Concerning the  Yogacara-madhyamika 
   est truth that an external object  (bdhydrtha) possesses the two natures of cold and  war-
                                              •••53)
   mth [at the same time]. 
 (54..• 
3-a-4. It is not contradictory that [a unitary cognition  (eka-jlidna) is accompanied by both 
   images of the perceived and the perceiver  (graya-grdhakdkara)] since the two natures 
 of cognizing and manifestation  appear in it. Therefore, the [homogeneous] example 
 ••.54) 
   (drstdnta) [of this inference] is devoid of the inferable property (sddhya). 
 (55••• 
3-a-5. If  [Alikakara-vadin] think that when the nondual cognition  (advaya-fiidna) can be 
   proven, then the nature of cognition [as a reality] is also spontaneously proven, this no-
   tion of yours would be wrong, for the intrinsic connection (pratibandha) is absent from 
   [the nonduality and the reality of cognition]. 
    In this case, how can the intrinsic connection between what is devoid of duality and 
   its own existence be established? 
     The reason is thatthere is no means of valid cognition that excludes the logical reason 
   of the contradiction of the inferable property  (sadhya-viparyaya-badhaka-pramdna) and
   any kind of [homogeneous and heterogeneous] examples cannot be established. [This 
   logical reason (hetu)] leads to inconclusiveness  (anaikantika) with regard to relations 
   such as those between the son of a barren woman and the dual [images of the  perceiv-
                                    ••55) 
   ed and the perceiver]. 
 (56••• 
3-a-6. The [previous] duality (dvaya) cannot be established through the [following] duality, 
   for then there would be an infinite series  (anavasthd). Another subject (dharmin)which
 3—a---4. 
(54••• 
 :ses pa gcig  la  yan  ges pa  dari  snan ba'i  no bo dag  snan  pa'i phyir mi  'gal ba  hid yod pas dpe bsgrub pas  ston 
                             •-•54) 
pa  hid kyan yin no // 
3—a-5. • 
(55••• 
 ji" ste  ges pa  ghis  dan  bral ba hid grub na  sugs kyis  duos po'i  no bo  nid  kyan  'grub par  'gyur  o  sham  du  sems 
na / blo gros  'di ni  Pan pa yin  te / 'brel pa med  pa'i phyir ro // 'di  la  gan  la  ghis  dan bral ba  de  gdon  mi  za 
bar  yan  dag' pa'i  duos po yod do  Zes bya ba'i 'brel pa  'di ci  Zi  gyod de / de bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad 
ma  med pa'i phyir  dan / de  lta bu'i dpe ma grub pa'i phyir ro // mo  eon gyi bu  la sogs pa  dan / ghis  po de 
                                                          
••55) 
nid kyis ma  nes par  'gyur ba'i  yan phyir ro // 
 3-a-6 
 (56-- 
thug pa meb par  'gyur  ba'i  phyir  ghis  la  ghis po  gan yod pa ni ma  yin no //  gran ba  la  sogs  pa'i  reg pas dben 
pa'i dro ba  la  sogs pa'i  no bo  bzin du  ghis kyi  no bo las ma gtogs pa  gan  la de  dan bral ba hid  du13 bsgrub par 
 gyur  °')` rtogs pa'i  no bo hid spyi'i  no bo chos can  glan  ni  yod  pa ma yin  te /  ghis po'i bdag hid kho na 
rtogs  pa'i  no bo yin  pa'i phyir ro // 'di  ltar  gan  zig bdag hid kho na rab  to gsal  ziri gsal ba  gian la mi  bltos" 
pa de ni rtogs pa'i mtshan hid yin no // lus  dan // sa  dan / ri  dan / chu bo  dan /  rgya mtsho  la sogs pa 
rnam pa sna tshogs`I'1811)phyi rol g i no bo hid du mdun na snan ba'i don gan yin pa de ni bdag hid kho nas 
 •••56) 
gsal ba'i phyir rtogs  pa'i  no bo hid las  mi  'da'  bar jug go//
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   does not possess a dual nature like the nature of warmth which is devoid of the touch of 
   cold, etc., and which possesses the nature of knowledge, a universal feature  (samanya-
   rapa), does not  exist. This is because the nature of the duality is none other than the 
   nature of knowledge. 
    The reason is as  follows: knowledge is characterized by its nature in that it is illumi-
   nated by itself and that it does not depend upon any other illumination  (prakdsa). As 
   the various images  (dkdra) which manifest in our presence as elements characteristicof 
   the external world such as body, earth, mountain, river and ocean are illuminated by 
   themselves, they do not transcend the range of knowledge. 
 -.56) 
   [Therefore, images are illuminated by themselves just as knowledge.] 
 (57.• 
3-a-7. When it (viz., the nondual cognition), too, operates in an unreal (alika) locale [viz., 
   latent impression  (  disand) which causes error  (bhrantz)], [the images  (dkara)] operate as 
   if they embrace the nature of knowledge just as our own body goes together with our 
   sweetheart. Accordingly, how could that which has been refuted [viz., the nondual cog-
   nition] be revived when it meets something with an incorrect dichotomy [viz., the images 
   of the perceived and the perceiver  (grahya-grdhakakara)]. [That is to say, as the images 
   are unreal, the nondual cognition is unreal.] If the dichotomy and the sweetheart [viz., 
   cognition], having just the same relation of identity  (tacidtmya), part from each other, it 
   is impossible that only [the nondual cognition] becomes the subject (dharmin), without 
   meeting the other [viz., images]. That is why [the logical reason (hetu) of this inference] 
   leads necessarily to the fallacy of the impossibility of the basis  (dcraydsiddhi). 
     In the same way, the Sautrantika, too, do not assert hat a cognition  (jndna) possess-
   es a twofold nature [viz.,  grahya-grahakdkara] in the true sense. This is because that 
   which does not have any sections [viz., cognition] is contradictory to [anything of a dual 
   nature]. Therefore, if you try to prove that [cognition] is a nonduality (advaya), what
3-a-7  
(57.- 
de  yan brdzun pa'i no bo  nid  kyl'5 rigs kyi khyim du  'jug par spyod pa na  ran gi lus  clan  khyad par  med par 
spyod pa'i mdza' mo  lta bur rtogs pa'i no bo  hid  clan / kun  to  'khyud pa  ltar spyod pas dam pa ma yin pa'i 
 gnis po dan phrad bas sun  phyun ba'i bdag  nid 'di yid brtan du ga  la run / de'i bdag  nid  lta bu'i  gkis  kyi no 
bo'i mdza' bo dan  bral na gan gis na  'di  glan dan  rni phrad 16  cin 'ba' dig  chos can du  'gyur ba'i gnas ni 
 gan du  yan mi 'thad do / de'i phyir gtan  tshi  gs gli ma grub pa kho na yin no / mdo sde pa  la sogs pa  yan  yan 
dag par na  des pa  ghth kyi  no bo  nid du mi 'dod pa kho na ste / cha  as med pa  la de  'gal ba'i phyir ro // de'i 
phyir de  gnis su med pa'i  no bo  nid du sgrub pa  yan ci  dig rab  tu bsgrub  17 par  'gyur  te  / phyi'i don kyan de 
 dan mi 'gal  ba'i phyir ro // gal  te tshad ma  glan gyi sgo nas phyi'i  duos  po  sal bar brjod na ni de  dah  'draba 
 -57) 
 hid du rnam par des pa  la  yan de ci ste  ne bar  mi brjod /
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   on earth would be proven? This is because the objects of the external world, too are 
   not contrary to [nondual cognition] [in that both of them are devoid of the dual images 
   of subject and object.] 
    If you asserthat the objects of the external world are denied by other means of valid 
   cognition  (pram-dna), how could the cognition  (  vijiidna), which is equal to that  [viz., the 
 —57) 
   object of external world] in nature, be also denied [by other means of valid cognition]? 
 (58-- 
 3-13-1. It is also surely contradictory to immediate xperience (anubhava) that [the dual ima-
   ges of the perceived and the perceiver  (grahya-grahakakara)] re  nothirig more thanunreal 
   (alika), as you have asserted, because they are a conceptual thought-construction based 
   only upon the relation of an agent (kartr) and his action (karman). The reason is that 
   although you [viz.,  Alikakakara-vadin]  assert hat cognition is devoid of the dual [images 
   of the perceived and the perceiver] from the viewpoint of highest ruth, still there are 
   various images uch as the color blue included in the mind (citta) which are evidently 
   perceived as if they are manifest in the external world  ( bahir) and independent  ( vicchi-
   nna) from [mind]. This is true not only for ordinary people who do not notice the spe-
   cific relationship(  visesa) in their conception of agent (kartr) and action (karman) but 
   also for [the saint] whose mind is devoid of error (dosa) in his knowledge. 
    If the varied existent [images  (eikara)] are conceived of onlyby depending upon [the 
   relation of the agent and action], their idiosyncrasy  (visesa) would not be obviouslymani-
   fested in [the minds] of even ordinary people [, for they do not notice the relationof the 
 -.58) 
   agent and action.] 
 (59.• 
3-c. If you acknowledge that the immediate experience (anubhava) which clearly manifests 
   the specific properties [of images] is surely unreal  (alika) because these images  (dkara) 
   are aggregates which are qualified by time and space, then when you seek emancipation
 3-b-1. 
 (58.- 
 gan  yan byed pa po  dan las kyi  clizos po kho na  la  bltos'8 pa las rab  tu brtags pa'i no bo yin pa'i phyir brdzun 
pa 'ba'  zig  tu  zad kyi  ies smras pa  gan yin pa de  yan nams su  myon ba dan  'gal ba kho  na'o //  'di  ltar khyed 
ni  yan dag par  na rnam par  ses pa  gnis su med  pa'i  rnam pa  kho nar  'dod  la /  snon  po  la sogs pa sems kyi 
rnam pa sna tshogs'9 phyi  rol  Hid du rnam par chad par  snap ba  yari byis  pa byed pa po dan las kyi tha  shad 
 du2° bye brag  tu mi  ses pa moms kyis  kyari  rtog' pa'i skyon dan  bral ba'i sems  la  yan 22 gsal rab  tu  yan 
 dag  par  myon no // de'i  (DI67b) sna tshogs kyi  duos po  Itos23 pa tsam las  ne bar brtags pa yin na ni byebrag 
 -.58) 
de  byis pa yan chad  la gsal rab  tu  snap bar  yan mi (P1825)  'gyur ro // 
3-c. 
 (59... 
gal  to khyed  rnam  pa'i  tshogs yul  doe' dus kyi gnas skabs  nes pas  tha dad pa de  ltar gsal rab  tu  nams u  myori 
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                                tik
 (moksa), why are you attached to that particular of knowledge, which devoid of the dual 
 [images of the perceived and the perceiver] are unverifiable, is itself surely characterized 
 by detachment  ( vivikta-svabhdva). Is there any other greed (raga) left besides this 
 attachment? [If you are attached to such knowledge], the wise have been astonished 
 for a long time [by such a foolish idea], just like one who regards a tail coming out of a 
 small window as the large body of an elephant. So, cut off this attachment by the sharp 
 •••59) 
 edge of a sward of wisdom for yourself. 
 [Conclusion:  ] 
 (€0••• 
 If the nature of cognition  (jii  dna) is real (satya), there is neither the relation  of identity  
(  tacidtmya) nor causation  (tadutpatti) between a thing which truly manifests and images 
 (dkara) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) 
 and the unreal  (alika), which are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parihdra-sthiti-laksana), 
 to have the relation of  identity  (tadatmya) and this does not explain how the unreal is 
 produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, 
 the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity  (taddtma)
ba de  yari brdzun pa hid du khas len na ni de'i tshe thar pa  'dod pa khyed rtogs  pa'i  rio bo ghis kyi  rio bos dben 
pa mi  mrion pa'i bdag hid la  yari dben pa'i  rio bo hid du  mrion par  len  ciri25  chags pa  glan ci  zig yod de / 
 glari po  lus chen po skar  khuri  sin  tu  chud du'i gseb nas  byuri ba'i mjug ma  1a26  'thogs' pa  gari yin pa  dari 
 dra bar mkhas pa  rnams  sin  tu yun  rin por ya mtshan rmad du  'chin par  byed  o  // de lta bas na bdag hid  ••.59) 
 kyis  .ces rab kyi  ral gri  hie  tu  rnon pos chags pa de chod la  'Or  Gig/ 
 [Conclusion: ] 
 (60 
ces  pa'i bdag  hid bden pa'i no  bo  de  la ni  gan  gis na de  la de  ltar gsal rab  tu  snari bar 'grur ba28 brdzun  pa'i 
bdag hid kyi rnam pa rnams  de'i bdag hid  dari / de las  byuri  ba'i  mtshan hid kyi 'brel ba29  'ga'  yari med de / 
 3° bd
en pa dan mi bden pa phan  tshun spans  te gnas pa'i mtshan hid dag ni de'i bdag hid du  'gal ba'i phyir 
 la / mi bden pa  yari  gan las  kyari skye bar khas  mi  len pa'i phyir ro // de skye na  yan 'di dag dus gcig tu de'i 
bdag hid du  snari bar ni mi  'gyur  te / rgyu  dari  'bras bu dag ni dus  dari  rio bo hid tha dad pa yin pa'i phyir 
ro //  'brel  pa med par  snari bar  ries  pa'ari rigs pa ma yin  te / ha  can  thal bar  'gyur ba'i phyir ro // de  lta bas 
na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i  no bo  dari tha mi 
..dad  pa'i  ran gi  rio bo'i  rnam pa mi bden pa'i bdag hidmows 
 snari bar khas  blaris  pa'i  phyir  de'i bdag hid  kyi mtshan hid  kyis 'brel  bar' khas  blare dgos so // de'i  phyir  ghi 
 ga'ari brdzun pa hid du gyur to // de  lta ma yin na ni  ji  ltar brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dan  Than  ci  g rtogs 
pa'i  no bo hid de'i bdag hid du hams su  myori bar  'gyur / de bas na bden pa  la  mrion par  len pa'i  lags pa  'di 
 -.60) 'or  ci  g / 1 kyi P 2  bzag P 3 Rho na D 4 do P 5  'bas P 6 ni P 7 The meaning of this world cannot be  
under-
stood. 8 ltos D 9  bo P 10 par P 11 ci P 12 pa P 13 P om. 14 ltos D 15 kyis D 16 'phrad P 17 sgrub P 
18 ltos D 19 kyi D 20 D om. 21 rtogs D 22 P om. 23 bltos P 24 P has / 25 P has / 26 D om. 27 
thogs D 28 P has / 29 pa D 30 D has // 31 P om. 32 par D 
(45) cf. SDNS IV (135), (47) cf. SDNS IV (133), (56) cf. SDNS IV (136) and MAP  P132a5-6  D124a', (60) cf. 
SDNS IV (132) and (137). 
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   at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with 
   respect to time and their own nature. 
   [Accordingly there is no causation  ( tadutpatti) between a real nondual cognition  (advaya-
   jiiana) and an unreal image  (akara).] It is unreasonable that the manifestation [of ima-
   ges] is certified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reduction-
   istic (atiprasanga). You should surely acknowledge a relation of identity  ( tdddtmya) 
   between them, since the manifestation of unreal images [in the present case], which do 
   not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowledged. Thus both of them  become 
   unreal (alika). Otherwise [if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and 
   images], how can an unreal image  (akara) and the nature of cognition be perceivedas 
   an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to [only nondual cognition]as 
 -60) 
    real. 
 IV. Explanation of the term,  "Yogacara-madhyamika" and its philosophical 
     characteristics in the  1Ta  ba'i  khyad par of Ye  les sde. 
                                                                                                        (61) 
 We cannot find the term  "  Yogdcara-madhyamika" in the texts of their own composition. 
Then, who is the first person who used this term? It is said that Ye ges sde  (  Jfianasena, c. 
 The beginning of 9c) coined the term when he composed the  1Ta  ba'i khyad par (Tkh) (the 
distinction of philosophical position), In that text he assigned  Bhavaviveka (c. A.D.500-570) 
                                  (62)
to the Sautrantika-madhyamika school and S-antaraksita (c. A.D.725-788) to the Yogacara-
             (62) 
madhyamika school. In addition to this fact, with other translators he translated texts of this 
tradition into Tibetan such as  Satyadvayavibhanga-karika (SDK), -vrtti (SDV) of  Ridnagarbha
(61)
 It is well known that the terms  "Yogacara-madhyamika" and  "Sautrantika-madhyamika" as well as the 
 Svatantrika nd the  Prasangika with regard to branches within the Madhyamika were created by Tibetan 
Buddhist scholars. In spite of this, according to recent research, the terms "Yogacara-madhyamika and 
 "Sautrantika-madhyamika" can also be found in one Indian commentary, that is, the  Paikakramatika  Krama-
rthaprakaci led of Laksmi. However, Laksmi, who was a nun of  Kas-mir, was active about the beginning of 
eleventh century, about two centuries after Ye  ges sbe. That is why Laksmi cannot be considered as the 
creator of the terms "Yogacara-madhyamika" and "Sautrantika-madhyamika". 
See BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA' of Katsumi  Mimaki  ,  p  p.  42-43.
(62)
 It may be unsuitable to use the terms the "Yogacara-madhyamika" and the "Sautrantika-madhyamika" 
here, because instead of these terms Ye  ges  sbe employs the terms the " rNal  'byor spyod pa'i dbu  ma  " and 
the  "mDo sde  (spyod  pa'i) dbu ma  "  respectively in his  1Ta  ba'i khyad par. About the examination of origin 
of the terms of the  "  rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma " and the " mDo sde (spyod  pa'i) dbu ma " themselves as
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(c. A.D. 700-760),  Satyadvayavidhanga-panjika (SDP),  Madhyamakalainkara-karika (MAK), 
-vrtti (MAV) of  Santaraksita and  Madhyamakalainkara-panjika (MAP) ,  Bhdvandkrama (BhK) 
of  Kamala0a (c. A.D.740-795). 
 In the light of this fact I believe that it is important to examine his view on the distinction 
 (63••• 
of philosophical positions in the  1Ta  ba'i khad par. Herein we find, "What are the two tenets 
of the Middle doctrine (dbu ma)? 
 Formerly, although Acarya Nagarjuna, who is an erudite master of Middle doctrine, and 
Aryadeva composed philosophical treatises on the Middle doctorine, still there did not exist 
two branches [of the Middle doctrine]. Later  Acarya Asanga and Vasubandhu composed 
commentaries ona theory which demonstrates that all existence is a product of mere consci-
ousness, establishing that no objects of the external world exist; instead, consciousness mani-
fests as an [external] object. They, then also advocates that a purified nondual cognition 
 (advayajnana) exists even from the viewpoint of highest ruth  (paramarthatas). After that, 
Bhavya [viz., Bhavaviveka] who was called "learned master" of the Middle  doctrine" was a 
follower of the doctorine of Acarya Nagarjuna nd arrived at the truth of the doctorine. 
Having refuted the theory of mere consciousness, hewrote the  Prajnapradfpa which was a 
commentary on Acarya Nagarjuna's  Madhyamaka-kdrika and Madhyamakahrdaya. In the 
medieval period, in conformity with Acarya  Asafiga's philosophical treatise on meditative 
practice (yogdcdra) which illustrated the theory of mere consciousness, the scholar  Santarak-
sita composed a philosophical treatise on the Middle doctrine called the  Madhyamakalainkdra 
where he stated [his  view]: while supporting the same theory of mere consciousness a that 
[of Asahga's philosophical treatise] from the standpoint of conventional truth, he nonetheless 
demonstrated that consciousness  (  vzjiidna) is also dovoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhdva) 
from the viewpoint of highest ruth. 
[That is why] there were born two kinds of philosophical treatises on the Middle doctrine 
whose tenets lightly differ from each other. Accordingly, [I] call the philosophy described 
in the work of Acarya Bhavya the Middle doctrine based on Scripture (mDo sde spyod  pa'i 
dbu ma), while  [I]  call the other philosophy in the work of Acarya  Santaraksita the Middle 
doctrine in conformity with meditative practice [from the standpoint of conventional truth] 
(the rNal  'boor spyod  pa'i dbu ma).
 they occur in  1Ta ba'i  khyad par, please refer to  1Ta  bahi khyad par 1:..131-3-ZITINgiffilz-Dt,,--"C of Matsumoto 
 Shiro  (*Sst.M). in  Sotoshu Kenkyuinkenkyusei Kenkyukiyo  (e-  fff5t:  5t,  ih!,W  ) No.13 (1981). 
(63) Tkh  pp.328-3331
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                          Concerning the Yogacara-madhyamika 
 With reference to [the philosophy in the works] of Acarya Nagarjuna nd Aryadeva, it is 
in conformity with the teachings of the  Aryaprajiktparamitd, etc. [They advocate the  follow-
ing:] 
 Although existence, in general, is produced from the standpoint of conventional truth  (sa-
Mvrtyd) just like an illusion  (maya) because it is of dependent origination  (prati-tyasamutpan-
na), still it is not reasonable that existence is produced from itself, from others, from both 
(itself and others) or from no cause from the viewpoint of highest truth  (paramdrthatas) in 
that it is devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhava). 
 That is how the two kinds of theMiddle doctorine are based on [the philosophy  of  Acarya 
Nagarjuna nd Aryadeva]. Among the two, the tenets of the rNal 'bror spyob pa'i dbu ma 
say, 
 [Our philosophy] is in conformity with the theory of the proponents of mere consciousness 
 (vijrianavadin) from the standpoint of conventional truth. The reason is that when an 
 object is perceived by cognition  (vzInana), the object itself is none other than the nature 
 of cognition. Therefore it is possible that [cognition as an object and cognition itself] are 
 associated with each other. That is why [we] can perceive [the object as a cognition] by 
 means of self-cognition  (svasainvitti). On the contrary, if one acknowledges that an object 
 is independent of [cognition], then it is impossible that one perceives [the object] in that 
 there is no relationship between [object] and cognition  (jiidna). As to that which mani-
 fests being dependently originated in the external world, for instance, it can be compared 
 to the case of dream where one sees the mind itself when one sees something, despite the 
 fact that there is no object [in the external world]. 
   It is also proclaimed in the  Lankavatara-sutra: 
 color-form  (  rapa) does not exist in the external world, it is our own mind manifesting in 
 the external world. 
  It cannotbe established that that mind is an existence in that it is devoid of the intrinsic 
 nature of unity  (eka) or multiplicity (aneka). 
 [Objection: ] What is the reason? 
 [Answer: ] The reason is that if an object  ( visaya) is none other than the nature of cog-
 nition (  vilhana), the mind would also come to be multiple  just  as objects are varied and 
 multiple. In the same way, as mind cannot be multiple so objects cannot be multiple. 
 That is why one must comprehend that objects in the external world are non-existent acc-
 ording to the theory of mind-only  ( citta-matra). According to the tenet of the Middledoct-
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 rine, one should understand that that mind is also devoid of an eternal self  (andtman). 
  It is also declared in the  Arvalokottaraparivarta: Oh! Son of the Victorious One (jinapu-
 tra). [The Bodhisattva] comprehends that everything in existence that belongs to the 
 three worlds  (traidhatuka) and the three periods  ( traikalya) [of the past, the present and 
 the future] is a product of the mind-only  (cittamatra). And then he comprehends that 
 that mind is also devoid of an end  and a middle  (anantamadhyatayd). 
   It is also proclaimed  in the  Lankavatara-sutra:
 Depending upon mind-only  (citta-matra), the Yogin does not imagine an object in the ext-
 ernal world. Observing truth, he should transcend mind-only.  After transcending mind-
 only, he should transcend non-manifestation [of the perceived and the perceiver]. The 
 Yogin who thus abides in non-manifestation beholds the great vehicle  ( mandyana). 
   That is why I explain that the tenets of this Middle doctorine [viz., the rNal 'byor spyod 
 pa'i dbu ma] is not contrary to [the teachings of] the Scripture. 
   On the other hand, the Middle doctorine based on the Scripture (mDo sde dbu ma) can 
 be described as: 
   Being in conformity with the tenet which is created by Acarya  Nagarjuna, he [viz., 
 Bhavya] demonstrates that all existence in the external world and in the internal world is 
 dependently originated  (prahlvasamutpanna). Then, [he] advocates that although [all 
 things] are existent like illusion  (  maya) since they are produced from cause (hetu) and 
 condition  (pratyava) from the standpoint of conventional truth (samvrtyd), still they are non-
 arising based on the four kinds of logical reasoning that it is not reasonable that they are 
 produced from themselves, from others, from both (themselves and others) and from no 
                                                                                                     -.63) 
 cause from the viewpoint of highest truth  (paramdrthatas). 
 Thus, according to Ye  ges sde, the philosophy of the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma can be 
defined as follows: 
it is in  conformity  with the theory of mere  consciousness or mind-only from the standpoint of 
conventional truth. However, consciousness or cognition  (  vzjnana) is also devoid of any int-
rinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth. This definition of the philosophy of the 
rNal  'bvor  spyod  pa'i dbu ma can be traced back to texts themselves of the  Yogacara-madhy-
yamika scholars; that is to say, Jnanagarbha,  Santaraksita,  Kamalagila, Haribhadra as I have 
 (611 
already shown. Finally, as to the tenets of the mDo sde (spyod pa'i) dbu ma which is descri-
bed above, it is in  conformity with following description if the Madhyamaka-hrdayavrtti of
 Bhavaviveka.
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                          Concerning the  Yogacara-madhyamika 
 (65••• 
   "We acknowledge that all things are existent like illusions since they are produced from 
                                                                                                                                                            •••65) 
   cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya) being correlative with [their effect]." 
 This is why we can safely say that Ye  8-es de's definitions of the theory of the rNal 'byor 
spyob  pa'i dbu ma and the mDo sde (spyod  pa'i) dbu ma are both tenable and correct. This 
judgement is supported by the fact that almost all texts which advocate the philosophies of 
the two schools of the Madhyamika were translated into Tibetan by Ye  ges sde. 
 V. Conclusion 
1)  Karnalagila as well as  Santaraksita acknowledges the theory of mind-only  (citta-mdtra) from 
the standpoint of conventional truth and, moreover, does not admit any independent exter-
nal object other than the mind (citta) even in terms of conventional truth.  , This philosophical 
                                                                                                            (66) 
position can also be ascertened in  Kamalagila's  SarvadharmanihsvabhCzva-siddhi (SDNS). 
This position can also be applied to other philosophers of the  Yogacara-madhyamika school, 
such as  Jnanagarbha and Haribhadra. 
2) The theory of mind-only which is acknowledged from the standpoint of conventional 
truth by the philosophers of the Yogacara-madhyamika school can be regarded to be based 
 (67) 
on the  Saindhinirmocana-sutra, the  Lankavatdra-sutra, nd the  Gahanavyuha, etc., all of which 
belong to a period prior to the division into the two branches of Satyakara and  Alikakara-
vadins. The reason is as follows: 
 a)  Kamalagila says in his  SDNS: 
 (68••• 
   The Blessed One proclaimed in the  SaMdhinirmocana-sutra, etc., as follows. 
   I declare that all existence are devoid of intrinsic nature for the purpose of explaining 
 thre.e kinds of non-substantiality with regard to three kinds of  nature_ 
   This teaching is not inconsistent with [our Yogacara-madhyamika philosophy], since it is 
   is not inconsistent [for Yogacara-madhyamika proponents] to establish three kinds of
 (64) 
(65)
(66) 
(67) 
(68)
 cf. II The  Yogacara-madhyamika view of Mind-only (citta-matra) of part II, I The Characteristic of the 
Yogacara-madhyamika philosophy and II The  Viinana Theory of  Kamalagila nd Haribhadra of Part III. 
 MHVT D221b5 
'di  lt
ar kho bo cag ni kun rdzob  to chos rnams rgyu  clan rkven rigs  rnthun  pa  las'bvun ba sgvu ma  biin  do  yod 
pa  kid  du  'dod de no bo kid med  pa'i  phyir Yamaguchi Susumu.  Bukko ni okeru Mu to U  tor.o 
Tairon  ILA  LA-  oDnalil, p.538 
 cf. II. The  Vzjiiana Theory of  Kamalagila nd Haribhadra. Note (25) (26) (30). 
 cf. Note (4) and p.29 of Part I. 
 Note (116) and (117) of SDNS. IV 
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                                           •••68) 
   nature  ( tri-svabhava). 
 b) In the same way, he states in his  SDNS: 
 (69••• 
   The Blessed One declared in the  Saindhinirmocana-sutra, etc., that such things as cogni-
   tion  (  vifiza-na) is a reality in order to have disciples (vineya) who adhere to arising  (utpa-
   da), ceasing  (nirodha) and so forth discard nihilistic ideas. The intention of this teaching 
 ••.69) 
   must  be understood not from the viewpoint of highest truth. 
 c)  Kamalagila also says in his  MAP: 
         (70.•• 
   [We] do not have inconsistency [in our position] because we advocate the teaching in 
   the  Saindhinirrnocana-sutra [viz., the theory of mind-only] which is referred to by the 
                                                                                                                             •.70) 
   Yogacara-vadins as correct from the standpoint of conventional truth. 
   In addition, LAS is often cited by  Kamalagila as well as  Jnanagarbha and  .Santaraksita 
   when they demonstrate that cognition  (  vzindna) is real from the standpointof conventio-
   nal truth. 
3)  Jnanagarbha,  Santaraksita,  Kamalagila and Haribhadra point out, in terms of direct per-
ception  (pratvaksa), the incompatibility of unity  (eka) and multiplicity (aneka) that exist bet-
ween cognition  (  viinana) and images  (dkdra) when they refute the view of the  Satyakara-
vadins. In refuting the view of the Alikakara-vadins, they point out the incompatibility that 
exists between the real nondual cognition  (advava-rizana) and unreal (alika) images. 
Moreover,  Kamalagila and Haribhadra show that nondual cognition cannot be proven by infe-
rence  (anzonana) and that there is neither a relation of identity  (taddtniya) nor one of causal-
ity  ( tadutpatti) between nondual cognition and unreal images  (alRakdra). 
4)  Jnanagarbha,  Santaraksita,  Kamalagila, and Haribhadra hold the same position and repre-
sent one lineage of the Yogacara-madhyamika school in that they refutate the theory of 
atoms and the Satyakara and Alikakaravadin position of mind-only, instead acknowledging 
from the standpoint of conventional truth the theory of mind-only  (citta-matra).
 (69) Note (9), (30) 
(70) MAP  P137a  ' D128a4-5 
 des na  rnam par  .ces pa smra ba  rnarns  kvis  dgons pa  nes par  'grel  pa'i mdo las bstan pas phyir  jil bar byed pa 
 gaga  yin pa  de  van dag  pa'i  kun rdzob to bstan  pa'i  phyir  mi  'gal ba  nid du  ies  stop par byed do // 
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